Agricultural parastatals since independence: how have they performed? by Grosh, Barbara
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http:/ /creativecommons.0rg/i icenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
AGRICULTURAL PARASTATALS SINCE INDEPENDENCE: 
HOW HAVE THEY PERFORMED? 
B y 
B a r b a r a G r o s h 
WORKING PAPER NQ. 4 35 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
P.O. BOX 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
JANUARY, 19 86 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. 
They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views 
of the Institute for Development Studies or of the 
University of Nairobi. 
This paper has protection under the Copyright Act, Cap. 
130 of the Laws of Kenya. 
-3- IDS/WP 435 
AGRICULTURAL PARASTATALS SINCE INDEPENDENCE: 
HOW HAVE THEY PERFORMED? 
By 
Barbara Grosh 
ABSTRACT 
The paper examines the performance record of 17 
agricultural parastatals, from independence to 1984. Data 
is presented showing capital invested, liquidity and gearing 
ratios, private and social returns to capital, real unit 
costs and real consumer and producer prices. Firms are 
classified as to which ones have had serious preblems with 
cost control or social rates or return, and when those 
problems developed. About half of the firms currentIv 
uyex'citxng are considered "good" performers. The data show 
that for most firms cost control problems preceded financial 
problems, and that pricing policies have not been a major 
cause of parastatal financial problems. Since 1976 several 
firms have developed severe financial problems, while before 
1976 no firm had such severe problems. Efforts to restore cost 
control after serious problems developed have rarely succeeded. 
Current policies of government are aimed at increasing central 
government control of all aspects of operations of all parastatals, 
a strategy which is not likely to succeed. 
(o X -r T 
1. Purpose of the paper 
The purpose of this paper is to report the results of a 
study of the performance of parastatals in the agricultural 
sector in Kenya, from independence until 1984. This paper 
is the first set of results from a larger study, covering 
approximately 40 of the largest parastatals in Kenya.* The 
aim of the research is to uncover what factors make for 
successful parastatal performance. A study was inade of the 
performance of this group of firms over the 22 year period 
since independence. The purpose of the present paper is to 
present the results of the first stage of the research: the 
analysis of comparable financial data for 17 agricultural 
/ 
parastatals. A considerable volume of information which is 
anecdotal or specific to particular firms has also been 
gathered, but it has not been possible to integrate and 
present most of it here. 
The organization of the paper is an follows. First 
there if a short theoretical discussion of how performance 
of parastatals should be studied. Next follows a discussion 
r 
of the data base compiled. Then follows a section which 
describes the results. This section begins by giving a 
description of investment in the agricultural parastatal 
sector. Then follows empirical discussions of two important 
aspects ol parastatal performance, social rates of return 
and efficiency. Next the information on rates of return and 
efficiency is integrated with information on trends in 
producer and consumer prices to answer the question "Who 
A 
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benefits from parastatal operations?" This section is 
organized to consider all four performance indicators, one 
firm at a time. Finally, the results are summarized and 
policy implications are discussed. 
2. What is performance? 
2,1 Theoretical bac'cground 
The term performance is ambiguous and must be defined. 
2 
Parastatals serve many interest groups. What is viewed as 
good performance by some of those interest groups may 
conflict directly or indirectly with what is viewed as good 
performance by other interest groups served. If one 
surveyed all those affectcd by the parastatals under study 
and asked for a rating of their performance, one could 
receive contradictory answers. This conflict of interests 
which revolves around para.ctatals is one of the most \ 
important factors in influencing their behavior. It is 
central to the story of parastatal performance, and not 
something that should be ignored by taking averages, or by 
deciding on one simple "social welfare function." 
In a nutshell, the role of parastatals is to create and / 
distribute surplus value. The major claimants on the 
surplus value they create can be categorized in four groups: 
the suppliers of the produce they process and distribute, 
the consumers of that produce, the state as owner of the 
capital which allows them to operate, and the managers 
through whose hands everything passes. Performance of 
parastatals must then be discussed in terms of how 
successfully surplus value is created and to whom it 
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accrues. 
Given that performance must be discussed in such 
multidimensional terms, can one speak of "good" performance 
and "poor" performance? Are there generally accepted norms 
by which parastatals can be judged? The author has used two 
axioms to guide the discussion. They will be stated now and 
used implicitly in the rest of the paper. 
The first axiom of desirable parastatal performance is 
that managers have no legitimate claim on surplus value 
created beyond the opportunity cost of their labor. It 
follows then that parastatals should be managed efficiently. 
Firms where real unit cost margins rise steadily due to 
managerial corruption or incompetence are poor performers. 
The second axiom is that each firm should, on average, 
over the years, pay its own way. If a parastatal 
consistently makes losses which must be financed from the 
public treasury, it is failing in its job of surplus 
creation. Its operation is a drain on the economy, aand it 
can be considered a poor performer. 
Beyond these two axioms there is much room for 
disagreement. A firm which makes high social returnss to 
capital exhibits 
one kind of success, a firm which paays its 
agricultural suppliers handsomely is successful in a 
different way, a firm which provides goods to wanancUhi at 
reasonable prices, succeeds in yet a third way. Ther>e is 
room for disagreement On what tradeoff should be made 
between these aspects of performance. In what follows the 
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actual tradeoffs made will be documented, but readers will 
be left to judge for themselves the desirability of the 
results. 
2.2 Discussion of data base 
The parastatal sector hap been defined to include those 
firms which are supported primarily, or supposed to be 
supported primarily, through sales of goods and services. 
This definition rules out large numbers of statutory boards 
which have educational, rfegulatory, research, or regional 
development functions, and. are supported primarily by grants 
from government. The paper covers a sample of 17 firms 
which have functioned in the agricultural sector since 
independence. The firms are lasted in Table 1. Not all 
have functioned simultaneously, new firms have been created, 
and some firms have been reorganised into other firms. The 
study has focussed on those parastatals which buy and 
process agricultural commodities. T»us the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation, while it deals wi+h agriculture, has 
been omitted, and will be included later when the results on 
financial parastatals are presented. Similarly, the 
Agricultural Development Corporation will be included with 
other firms which hold multiple subsidiaries. Within the 
limits of this definition of the agricultural kecvor « the 
sample of firms is virtually complete.3 0 a t a f o r 24^ t f 
272 firms-years has been assembled. 
The study has relied almost exclusively on data from th€* 
audited annual accounts of the parastatal bodies themselves, 
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TABLE 1 FIRMS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
YEARS OF OPERATION MISSING 
SINCE INDEPENDENCE YEARS 
Chemelil Sugar Co. 60-34 68-72 
Coffee Board of Kenya 63~84a 84 
Cotton Lint S Seed Marketing Brd 63-84 84 
East African Sugar Industries 66-84 66-71 <• CD
 
•JS
 
Horticultural Crops Dev. Auth. 67-84 67-71 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries 63-84 
Kenya Meat Commission 63-84 83,84 
Kenya Tea Development Authority 63-84 
Maize Marketing Board 63-66 
Maize and Produce Board 67-80 
Mumias Sugar Co. 73-84 
National Cereals and Produce Brd 80-84 
Nzoia Sugar Co. 79-84 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board 63-84 78,81 ,82 
South Nyanza Sugar Co. 80-84 
Uplands Bacon Factory 63-84, 
Wheat Board of Kenya 63-80 
Notes: 
a. Before 1971 the coffee industry was handled by 2 firms, 
the Coffee Board of Kenya and the Coffee Marketing Board. 
In 1971 the latter was merged into the former. For 
comparability of presentation the accounts have been merged 
for previous years. 
b. Most of the actual functions of the Wheat Board were 
carried out by the Kenya Farmers' Association on an agency 
basis. Before 1972 the Wheat Board accounts present«ed only 
the accounts for its own administrative costs, and e:xeluded 
trading results. Therefore, most of the tables present data 
only after 1972. 
supplemented by data from government publications s u c h as 
the Statistical Abstract. The annual reports were obtained 
mainly from the Government Investments Division of t'he 
Ministry of Finance, the Kenya National Archives, the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, with a few reports obtained 
directly from the parastatals themselves, or from the 
Inspectorate of Statutory Boards. It is likely that more 
complete coverage could be obtained if sufficient time were 
invested in contacting the firms themselves, but where 
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attempted this has generally proven to be a frustrating and 
unfruitful approach. The author also conducted interviews 
with managers of several of the firms. The interviews 
provided interesting insights into the perceptions of 
managers about the problems confronted by their firms, as 
well as information about particular events or institutional 
changes, which helped in the interoretation of the published 
data on which the paper primarily relies. 
There are obvious weaknesses in the use of annual 
accounts as the major data source, and they merit comment 
here. First, the accounts are by and large oriented to 
meeting reporting requirements of the various statutes, 
including the Companies Act, under which the parastatals 
function. Thus their purpose is to satisfy legal accounting 
requirements, not to give the sort of data economists would 
most prefer to see. Sometimes the results reported may vary 
dramatically from economic reality. For example, many 
oarastatals hold shares in other firms, some of which have 
performed poorly. Although the assets of these subsidiaries 
may be largely eroded away by accumulated losses, the shares 
continue to be carried on the books of other parastatals at 
cost, thus distorting the picture "iven of the parent firms. 
Another example involves problems of inflation accounting. 
It is normal accounting procedure in Kenya to list assets at 
cost less depreciation. Where there is significant 
inflation going on in capital goods markets, which there has 
been during some of the time since independence, this can 
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result in underprovision of depreciation and overstatement 
of rates of return. 
Fiscal reporting years differ between the firms, and 
it is for this reason, combined with problems of missing 
data, that aggregate figures for the sector are not given in 
this paper. The firms vary dramatically in the level of 
detail in which they report. Some list their assets, costs 
and revenues in great detail along with other data such as 
employment levels and output levels, while others give the 
barest summary figures.*4 The quality of the data varies by 
firm. Some have well developed cost accounting systems, 
while others lack the most rudimentary of accounting and 
control systems. Sometimes these differences in quality can 
by surmised from the reports themselves, i.e. the auditor's 
statement will be negative, but one must assume that there 
are many cases of faulty data which go undetected. 
Having, considered these important weaknesses in the 
data base, one must perhaps justify its use. Two responses 
can be made. First while the data available are not ideal 
or complete for economic analysis, they still contain 
substantial information, most of which has never been 
examined in a systematic way to explore what parastatal 
performance has been. Thus, while many interesting 
questions about parastatal performance may remain 
unanswered, a start, can be made. Major trends can be 
detected, if not all the. factors which caused, them. 
Second, the author believes that, while the accounting 
systems of the parastatals may be inadequate for detecting 
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and preventing such problems as embezzlement, corruption and 
inefficiency, by and large the accounts are probably fairly 
accurate reflections of the financial transactions they 
report. Subject to the qualifications stated above, the 
statement of assets, revenues and costs is more or less 
accurate. If the costs are inflated by corrupt or 
inefficient practices, that will often be undetectable, but 
that the costs were incurred at more or less the levels 
stated can probably be relied on. Sometimes even this 
cannot be assumed, i.e. the auditor's statement for the 
Kenya Meat Commission for the years 1979-31 stated that they 
could not confirm the accuracy of even this type of 
information. But even in such cases it is thought that the 
accounts as reported reflect an accurate enough picture to 
merit inclusion. In the years mentioned for the Kenya Heat 
Commission there cpn be no doubt of large losses and a 
rapidly eroding capital base, though the exact amounts may 
differ from those reported. 
3. Results 
3.1 Trends in Financial Condition 
Table 2 shows the capital invested in agricultural 
parastatals, from independence to 1984. These figures 
reflect access to capital, whether from retained earnings or: 
from borrowing. The definition of capital invested which 
was used is net total assets, i.e. total assets less current 
liabilities. This definition was chosen instead of total 
assets, because it was felt that it was more robust to 
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coincidences in timing of financial transactions. For 
example, a firm may in one month have large current assets 
and large current liabilities because it has received the 
proceeds for sale of its crop but hasn't yet paid farmers. 
In the next month it does so, reducing both the current 
assets and the current liabilities. It was judged that this 
type of transaction doesn't reflect a change in the capital 
invested in the firm, which is in accord with the definition 
chosen.^ 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the 
table. First, it is noteworthy that from independence to 
1976, only one parastatal, the Cotton Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board, had significant trouble maintaining i£s 
capital base. The rest, though they suffered occasional bad 
years, or even several years of stagnation, were able to 
maintain their capital bases. 
From 1976 the story changes, as can be seen in 
Figure 1. From 1976 four firms, including the Cotton Board, 
the KCC, Uplands Bacon, and the Wheat Board began suffering 
serious erosion of their capital bases. In 1977 they were 
Followed by the KMC. In 1973 the Maize and Produce Board 
started the slide. In 1930 Mzoia, Humias and Sony sugar 
companies all began serious and prolonged erosion of their 
capital bases. In 1931 the newly formed National Cereals 
and Produce Board began a steep decline in its already 
negative capital base. 
Of all these 10 firms which have suffered significant 
declines in capital base, only the KCC has been able to 
- LL- W S L W f . 
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the school milk program. The trend has beer; so severe that 
by 1900 one firm, the !'heat Board, was reporting negative 
capital invested, that is its current liabilities exceeded 
its total assets. By 1>03 four firms had negative capital 
invested, including the Hotton Board, the i'lCPB, the KiiG and 
Uplands. This group seerjf likely to be joined by Hzoia in 
1905. 
Table 3 give 3 the ratio of equity to total capital 
invested. From this table it can be seen that many of the 
parastatals are highly leveraged. In 1933, out of a total 
of 13 firms, seven had virtually zero or negative net worth, 
four having a net worth so negative as to constitute 
negative capital invested. 
Thir table gives one small ray of hope. Whereas we 
noted above that beginning in 1900 the total capital base of 
iiumias began to decline fairly rapidly, here we see that 
this trend '<as accompanied by a decrease in the gearing 
ratio. 'Je c.n assume thrt the decline in capital invested 
reflects a voluntary liquidation of long tern debt., not an 
erosion of n't wo-th. 
Table 4 shove the current ratio, that is the ratio of 
current assets tr> current liabilities. The conventional 
wisdora on curr ?n: ratios used to be that a ratio between two 
and three would give sufficient liquidity without incurring 
excessive capi-.tl costs. Recently, as interest rates have 
risen and short cerm capital markets have grown more 
sophisticated, the generally accepted guideline has fallen 
\ 
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NC^B .39 .51 .68 .67 .63 
NZCiA 4.28 . 7 9 .93 2.18 1,47 .85 .52 .32 
PVBOARD 1.15 1.29 1.43 1.47 n.a. 1.81 1.70 n.a. n .a. 1.33 1.53 
SQNV .02 19.83 2.28 . 9 4 .E3 .63 , 5 4 .49 
UPLANDS 1.22 1.55 1.24 1.06 1 . 0 0 .69 . 6 3 ,61 .29 ,23 . 1 9 
WHEAT ,6a .93 1.46 .59 .47 1 A W i 1 u/ 
a. = not ava i l ab le 
urce: annual repo r t s , var ious years 
-15- IDS/T/P 435 
as low as 1.4. Certainly a current ratio below 1.0 reflects 
a firm with liquidity problems, one which is bound to make 
late payments to its suppliers. 
Table 4-shows that during the first decade of 
independence, only two firms suffered chronic liquidity 
problems, Chemelil and East African Sugar Industries'. These 
two firms later recovered their liquidity. The KCC hovered 
at the edge of liquidity problems during the first decade of 
independence. 
During the second decade of independence, illiquidity 
was a more general problem. XCC, KFJC, Humias, HCP3, Mzoia, 
Sony, Uplands and the T/heat Board all suffered severe and 
long-lasting liquidity problems. The fact that six firms 
established since independence, including the five sugar 
firms and the NCPB, suffered inadequate capitalization 
illustrates that this squeeze on parastatal operations can 
be considered to be a government policy, not just a 
condition developed by some of the older firms. The sugar 
firms were being starved of liquid funds at the same time 
that large revenues were being withdrawn as excise taxes. 
There can be little doubt that the low levels of 
liquidity shown in thip table are a direct cause of the late 
payments to farmers which are so often reported, and that 
such late payments' have significant negative repercussions 
on farmers' incentives. It would be an interesting exercise 
to compare this form of credit from farmers to the 
parastatal sector to the totals of seasonal credit from 
-16- IDS/T/P 435 
parastatals to farmers. 
3.2 Social Rates of Return to Capital 
Much of the popular image of the poor performance of 
parastatals is due to the large losses they earn. For the 
purposes of this paper, financial profit is not a suitable 
measure of the return to capital. '/here a firm is owned by 
the government, the government has considerable leeway in 
how the firm is capitalized, i.e. debt vs. equity, and how 
its returns are realized, i.e. through profits, interest 
payments or excise or other taxes. To a large extent these 
differences are arbitrary, and to consider only one form of 
return to capital gives a distorted picture. Therefore the 
definition of social returns to capital includes pre-tax 
profits plus interest payments plus excise or export duties. 
Table 5 gives two alternate sets of figures which give 
a different impression of the returns of the firms in the 
sample. The top half of the table gives pre-tax profit as 
conventionally defined, and as reported by the firms. It is 
from this set of figures that the popular impression of 
parastatals as sinkholes for public money is derived. 
Caution must be used in interpreting the totals on this 
table, because of missing data. Thus the totals for the top 
and bottom half of the table can be compared, but the time 
trends are not adequate measures for the entire sector. 
This caution notwithstanding, it is obvious from the 
top half of Table 5 that the parastatals in the agricultural 
sector have lost large sums on aggregate since 1977. The 
total is mostly dominated by the performance of the maize 
r ( - . B t _ £ 5 . R E T U R N S T O C A P i U ' A L I N A S R l C U s - J U R A L R A x A S T A i ' A L S 
1963 1964 1965 196$ 1967 : *68 1964 1270 
A. BEc0R£ TAX PROFITS 
Clt f !ELlL n .a . p .a , n.a 
CSK { 898,640! 484,220 '43,380 1,020,240 289,780 < 776,900) < 474,400! iiuuoi ,220 
CLISH6 ; 648,140) 1,X0/ (5,156,260) t 4,706,100) (4,187,740) ;3,431,800) 2,341,6*0 226 .500 
EASI n ,a . n .a , n .a , n . s 
4CDA n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a 
KCC 2.582,840 2,460,660 3,118,900 3,116,200 1,311,940 2,504,860 1,228.800 1,891 ,000 
KtfC 2,470.700 858,8S0 1 , 4 9 0 / 0 0 853.820 •>6,987,680) 1,422,900 2 .096, .40 3,806, ,120 
KTDA \ 3.283,62C? ' ; 4,823,920) 15,517.820) 5 5,450,040) 12,753,540! 109,740 i3,551,340) 1,724, , 960 
,1MB ! 18,080,920; ' ; 11,987,400) 726,600 i 7,166,380) 
M4P3 2,969,880 4,698,780 8.107,180 , 0 i 2 , :00 
MUXIAS 
NCFS 
NZOIA 
? '/SOARS 0 1 1,760,120) A 0 C A V 200 0 
sew 
UPLANDS 306,400 513,980 ! 85,400) 533,140 391,730 500,800 663,560 1,044,420 
MEAT SI D-.A 0 i , t LV 60,640 79,340 54.420 i 23,000; 
Tota l i J , 0 4 3 , 3 8 0 ; ; 13.0^6,4+0) (4,980,200) ! i i , 7 1 7 , 2 0 0 ) 18,904,940) 5,107,720 10,466,220 13,337.320 
Nunber of f i r s s w i n g losses 
4 of 3 3 s( 3 3 of 3 3 C* 9 3 of 9 1 of 9 2 of 9 1 of 9 
B. SOCIAL RETURNS TQ CAPITAL 
n . s . 
1,653,220 
226,500 
n .a , 
n . a , 
2,461,280 
4,986,080 
3.S5i ,5&0 
3,232,660 
HUNIAS 
NCPB 
•MZOIA 
PY&OARD 3,536,900 1 ,2 l9 ,5u0 1,198,500 737,430 802,920 1,053,060 200 V 
S0Nv 
UPLAVDS 992,520 690,940 39,620 6^2,820 542,520 6 l 2 ,740 796,280 1,167,405 
WHEAT 81,920 60.640 79,340 54,420 < 23,000) 
Total i 11,357,900) ( 169,500) 11,321,130 9,546,720 10,803,900 20,607,160 25,495,800 171555 j 7 v 
KuifSer of f i r « s Faking negat ive soc ia l re tu rns 
4 of 8 2 of 6 2 of 8 3 of r i 3 of 9 1 of 9 t of 9 1 of 9 
n,a,=not available 
Huflbe'5 n parentheses are nega t i ve , 
' l s s m g ; I n t e res t oayaents oy C t e a e i i i , 1971-72 
I n t e r e s t p a y i s n s by the Pyrect ruu Board 1969-74 
Social r e tu rns inc lude p re - tax p r o f i t s , i n t e r e s t payaents and excise and expert taxes, 
u r t n t L i L n .a . .n.a. 
CBK ( 870,220) 8,185,520 14,256,600 19,601,940 15.527,980 6,630,640 7,696,4a0 
CLiSf.8 1 648,140) 1,207,240 (5,156,260) i 4,706,100) (4,187,740) (3,431,800! 2,341,6J>0 
£ASi n .a . n . a . n .a . n .a . 
HCDA n .a . n .a . n .a . 
KCC 1,246.900 1,419,440 1,512,000 1,263,280 1,534,180 ho
 
CO
 
CO
 
o 1,506.600 
KMC 3,617,320 1,971,430 2,600,400 2,043,820 (5,653,020) 2,962,340 3,247,400 
KTDA ( 2.538,400) < (4,205.040) ( 3.862,940) ( 793,400) 2.032,900 <1.286,260! 
HNB i 17,194,780) i ! 11,026,3601 1,075,360 ( 6 , wt'D, 5001 
1&PB 2,969,880 8,060,060 11,139,060 
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. £ 5 C O N T ' D 
w 1972 illl 
KIRE TM P90fITS 
KlCLlL n.a. < 14,380,080) 1 25,473,720) 
Bk 1,080,340 1,142.300 5,390,720 
t i S M 3,309,480 8,028,440 2,026,960 
AS! n.a. n.a. n .a . 
C5A n.a. ' 34,276) t 146,580) 
cc 1,103.000 < 2,497,160) ( 10.891,440) 
JtC 6,728,840 10,456,380 6,617,760 
IDA 1 295,640) 4,985,830 6.656,630 
ins 
m 13,505,240 ( 6,271,860) ( 8,240,260) 
DIMS 3,061,840 
CPB 
•ZDIA 
ABOARD 936,340 8.508,020 5,038,300 
fl-N'r 
fLAXDS 266,200 ( 397,760) 433,540 
(EAT 31.760 9,419,660 932,4aa 
Tot a! 26,665,560 18,757,544 ( 14,542,740) 
kiiber c f i r * s sakir.g lasses 
2 BT 10 5 of 11 4 of 11 
CIAL RETURNS TO CAPITAL 
HEHELIL n.a. 6,759,086 ( 3,618,667) 
:BK 1,080,340 1,142,300 5,390,720 
im 3,309,480 8,028,440 2,478,140 
asi n.a. n.a. n.a. 
m n.a. ( 30,104) 1 142,095) 
:cc 1.532,040 1 2,313,660) { 10,347,820) 
3$C 7,854,140 11,424,440 7,515,720 
IDA 1,591,340 7,255,160 8,559,000 
«B 
4Pi • 14,253,080 i 3,:89,560) ( 1,102,620) 
M l AS 12,777,580 
CPi i 
zaiA 
'('BOARD 
fljjy 
936,340 8,508,020 5,1)83,300 
F,ANDS 380,600 ( 295,74y) 552,580 
HEAT 33,420 9,569,460 4,257,560 
1974 1975 i i / 6 iSZZ 
19,905,360) ! 3,191,960) 22,141,220 15,462,503 
6,945,040 832.980 17,542,060 ( 9 , i 42 ,68M 
3,157,000 1 8,535,560) 12,355,480 
1.452,641 886,254 7,691,426 4,663,775 
347,264) t 357,313) ( 2,308,793) i i 17 k. 41 v2v) 
13,695,920 8,628,360 30,060 ( 50,460,260) 
5,063,320) ( 10.927,660) 15,636,320 ( 12,867,980! 
4.172,860 550,060 1,451,460 20,632,200 
29,801,560 i 5,236,920) i 62,763,380) ( 70,166,300) 
15,024,540 25,824,000 34,035,700 60,400,000 
8,837,180 7,362,060 13,473,120 7,377,060 
3,775,140 43,080 ! 776,160) 369,440 
i Z , 891.880 )- 16,850^940 .35.^ 9 JiZ^ 520 i 13,342,440) 
48,671,557 •j2|729j32i 94,531,231 ( 43.798,705) 
4 of 13 5 of 13 3 of 13 6 cf 12 
2,489,208 18,398,397 59,712,900 62,926,440 
6,965,040 832,980 17.562.060 71,159,000 
3,438,040 i 6,593,660) 13,500,240 
17,597,505 16.008,904 28,292,226 32,114,651 
325,502) i 316,63*) ( 2.248,201) i 1,680,812) 
13,695,920 8,628,360 30.060 ! 47,533.260) 
3,618,84-0) ( 6,520,440) 21,397,100 ( 9,449,130) 
5,515,480 2,170,440 3,269,320 19,932,200 
36,173,700 3,156,280 < 46,973,700) ! 42,885,980) 
41,836,200 53,901,940 91,860.100 152,840,000 
8,837,180 9,010,360 16,136,480 8,217,620 
3,895,280 204,760 ( 453,140) 788,040 
8,227,480) 21,672,020 48,136.940 I 1,259.660! 
30,'70,760 46,457,042 32,403,398 128,272,731 120,753,707 250,287,365 243,165,059 
luwer of f i r t s (liking negative sociai returns 
1 of 10 4 ot 11 4 of 11 3 of 13 3 of 13 3 of 13 5 of 12 
/ 
• A V - I D S / i * J P 4 3 3 
! A B L E 5 C O N P C 
1978 t?7? 1930 
A. BEFORE T»X PROFITS 
D B E L t L 15,408-660 6.411,620 29,744,020 
CSr. 23,705,420 9,129,500 9.227,140 
CU3K8 { 4,080,960) ( 10,597,120) i 25,344,240! 
EASI l5,61v,163 3,819,892 
HCDA ( 248,207) r 61,734) 613,137 
KCC (. 29,181,6201 < 3,119,080! 12,496,240 
KhC i 35,563,800' / { j 3 , 5 3 2 , 3 < S O ! i 21,709,3*0) 
KTDA 21,559, "?60 12,871,000 i 10,595,000; 
•MB 
tePB [ 45,920,200) ( 174,924,640 i 270,279,260! 
HU«1AS 45,560,000 2,900,000 16,860,000 
HCPB 
NZDIA i 65,685,160) ( 52,&79,567i 
PY60ARD n.a, \ 6,310,880) 19,925,130 
SOfCT I 31,480,702) 
'JPlAfiDS ! 1,046,260) ( 6,696,5s0) ! 6,873,200) 
( 18,776,580) / \ 31,033,330) i 1.684,380) 
Total ( 32,975,444.! ; 292,413,121! ( 327,958,101) ! 
*u iber of f i r a e (taking losses 
7 of 12 9 of 14 3 of 15 ' 
8. SOCIAL RETURNS TO CAPITA!. \ 
CriElitLlL 21,628.500 55,055,580 92,537,520 
CBK 137,239,060 100,333,900 105,612,240 
CLASPS i 1,875,960! < 5,480,920) ! 12,772,260) ( 
EASI 63,044,557 61,965,64! 60,459,459 
HCCA i 202,662; ( l 0 , 3 i l i 657,020 
KCC ( 21,671,200! 5,117,980 25,096,280 
K-1C i 32,316,080) I 28,331,780) ( 15,913,080! I 
KTDA 21,559,960 12,871,000 ( 10,595,000) t 
MB 
11PB ! 26,955,380) ( 132,551,640) ( 235,66?,620) 
Hltill AS 156.320,000 151,580,000 212,780,000 
NCPB i 
MCI A ( 28,138,169! 30,011,582 { 
PYB0ARB n.a. ( 6,244,960) 19,"34,220 
SONY 1,954,467 ( 
yPL^DS ! 391,820! ( 6,084,100) i 6,102,200) ( 
MEAT 1,396,340 ( 14,262,400; 5,150,100 
Total 317,775,315 165,769,323 273,140,633 
NuaEe' f i r n s safcina negative soc ia l returns 
6 of 12 8 of 14 5 of 15 
l ? § i i?32 1983 i?34 
4,995,080) ! 12,734,920! 13,036,740 47,430,840 
2,657,660 6,754,900 13,162,720 n .a . 
21,304,480) 1 19,589,120) i 32,025,320) n.a, 
21,090.455) ! 24.190,291! I 15,950,336) n.a. 
768,511 1,111,298 1,689,465 n.a, 
24,161,720 2,292.200 991,640 37,704,400 
38,201,440) ! 49,954,720! ( 32,115,360) 1 ! So,705,020! 
7,870,000! ( 65,334,000) ( 42,560,000) 100,66E,COO 
1.540,000! i 5,020,000) 45,400,000 165,940,000 
304',781.120! ; 339,634,640! ( 431.375,460! ( 255,093,636! 
82,919,447! i 1,8,670.479) ( 107,355,751) < 105,305,432! 
n.a. n .a. 12,541.320 ( 5,877,120! 
66,237,677! i 111,567,733! ! 121,772,946! ' I 109,901.962.: 
6.368.-880) i 7,865,860; ! 4,274,200! ' I 11,517,320) 
347,700,388) 1 744,403,365! l 750,607,488! I i 189,457,220) 
10 of 13 10 Df 13 7 of 13 5 of 9 
52,065,220 25,559,440 63,233,520' 108.112,440 
77,676,840 114,813.560 177,599,040 n .a . 
5,954,ii30S t 1,046,680! ( 11,053,740) n .a . 
22,693,666 1T '"it 7 29,367,930 n.a, 
786,131 1,125,661 1,697,205 n.a. 
38,185,300 22,165,100 22,104,980 58,323.030 
28,837,400) ( 35,557,330) ( 19,489,040) i 38,094,460) 
7,870,000! 1 65,334,000! ( 42,560,000! 100,863,000 
210,260,000 190,160,000 243,140.000 367.,277.000 
220,469,560) ! 205.093,180! ( 235,013,960) < 11,546,546! 
397,264! i 29,249,178! ! 8,874,347! I 32.973,070) 
n .a , n .a. 32,957,720 13,399,440 
15,174,165) ( 29,631,225) ( 40,218,562! ! 23,092,102! 
6,012,340! ( 6,741,760! ( 3,273,220! ! 10,516,340) 
116,973,/43 ( 5,307,269) 209,612,526 531,757,442 
7 of 13 7 of 13 6 of 13 4 of 9 
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trading firm — the Maize and Produce Board up to 19 GO and the 
National Cereals and Produce Board since then. Most of the 
rest of the net losses can be attributed to the sugar firms 
which lose money--Hzoia and Sony, and the Kenya Meat 
Commission. Although the aggregate losses were largely 
accounted for by three firms, other firms also experienced 
difficulties. Throughout the period 1977-1984, over half of 
the firms for which data is available reported losses. Of 
the 16 agricultural firms which operated in that period, 
seven reported losses in every year for which data is 
available. In 1931 and 1982 10 of the 13 firms for which 
data is available reported losses. , 
Earlier profit performance of the agricultural 
parastatals was different. At independence the sector was 
earning small losses, which were steadily reduced so that by 
1960 it had been turned into a small profit which persisted 
until 1976, with an exception only during the oil crisis 
year of 1973. 
The lower half of the table uses "social returns" as 
defined above. A comparison of the totals from the upper 
and lower halves of the table quickly reveals that the use 
of the social returns measure gives a picture which is not 
nearly so bleak as the picture described above. The 
agricultural parastatals were making a positive social 
return by 1965. They continued to make a small positive 
return until the mid-seventies, by which time the aggregate 
amounted to over Shs 100 million per year, a performance 
which lasted until 1931. It is only in the difficult year 
-21- IDS/T/P 435 
of 19C2 that the social returns of agricultural parastatals 
has been negative, a condition which was strongly reversed 
in 1933 and 1984. 
The difference in the picture which emerges derives 
from large excise tax contributions from the sugar sector 
and large export duties from the coffee sector. These 
taxes, together with the sum of interest paid, are enough to 
cancel out the losses of the biggest money losers. 
Aside from the sugar and coffee sectors, switching from 
profits to social returns as defined above doesn't change 
the performance picture dramatically. In the 1977-34 period 
about half the firms were making negative social returns 
each year. The totals come out so positive because of the 
heavy tax burden borne by the sugar and coffee sectors 
compared with all other agricultural commodities. 
Table 6 gives the social rate of return for each firm, 
that is, it gives social returns as reported in the bottom 
half of Table 5, divided by the net total capital invested, 
given above in Table 2. :"iased on this table we can classify 
those firms which have yielded significant social rates of 
return. This classification is shown in Table 7. There are 
five firms which have yielded substantial rates of return, 
though one of these has lately suffered a marked decline in 
social returns. Three firms have earned enough to be / 
generally self-sufficient. On the other hand, nine firms 
have not yielded any substantial rate of return for any 
prolonged period, with many years of negative returns found. 
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3 L E 6 . iBOC I AL„ R A 7 E . S O F R E T U R N 
Ittl i?6 f 1965 i i § 6 1947 196tj 194? 1970 m 1972 1973 
CHEMELIL p. a. n.a. n.a. n.a, 12.32 ( 5.92) 
CBK ( 11.82) 104.12 185,12 227.02 i7T Vi I f Ms -Jtu 80.62 99.92 15.02 10.12 10.42 . 32=92 
CLiSrB ( 2.82) 5.52 ( 28,32) ( 34.92) 1 45.02) ( 42.22; 22.12 2.02 22.62 36.22 11.82 
EASi n.s. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a.' r ,a . n.a.. 
HCDA n.a , n .a , n.a, n.a. n.a. i 6,52) i 18.52) 
<cc 5.82 6.62 7.1? 5.42 6.32 10,42 5,02 6.52 3.82 ( 5.92) i 26,92; 
KMC 10,82 5.82 7 . 5 2 ' 5.92 9 19.72) 9,72 10,02 14.4% 21.32 26,92 15.62 
KTDA (298.22) ( 93.92) (169,52; ( 53.72) ! 9.32) 17.82 ( 10.92) -•l Vi iu i Of. 10.22 33,82 37,12 
m ( 74.02) ( 32.72) 6.82 ( 34.02; 
HtFI 9.^2 45.12 24.82 7,52 •/L VI {.Oa 'Jfi ( 2,62) i i .42) 
K'JHIAS •;a try 
NCP3 
KOiA 
PVSOARD 22.72 7.52 7 *7 1 i IN 4.12 4 . i » 4.82 0.02 0,02 3,42 •7 7V i.-Ji J.i .12,72 
SOflv 
UPLANDS 9.22 6.52 .42 4.82 5. OX 5,?X 7,42 10,32 1 5V | •}fjti 1 i 2,92) 5,62 
m r 18.42 12. IX 13.77, 816 It ^ : .52) .72 48,62 20.62 
J9 74 i ! Z 5 1226 12ZZ 1978 1V79 i OOr\ - /uv 1981 1982 1933 1984 
CHEficllL 3.62 18.92 52.02 49.22 IS. 42 v7t Oft 53.82 •?i TV Ol, On 16.62 33.32 57.02 
CBK 29.4', 3.42 41.8X 216.82 242.82 231.02 155.02 110.82 159.72 , 2L.8X n.a. 
CH5I1B 14.22 i 35.92) 44.22 ( 4.22) ( 20.52) (136.42) « * « i i i l i * * « « n.a. 
EAS! 34.02 31.82 39.02 37.92 58.62 55.02 23.22 9.42 5.42 11.92 n,a. 
HCDA ( 42.52) ; 47.62) (342,82) (167,IX) ( 14,52) ! .72) 43,12 37,32 34,92 29.92 n.a. 
KC5 23.12 11.22 0.02 (137,92) (146.42) 21.52 31.52 23.82 12.82 9.12 13.52 
KHC ( 7.62) ( 10.51) 30.52 ! 11.12) i 43,52) ( 88.62) ( 49,62) !350.22; H ( f t * * « * 
KTDA 17.92 4.3X 3.92 12.32 10,02 4.72 ( 3.221 ( 1.82) ( 12.22) ( 7,62) 14.62 
HUB 
fWtPB 21.38 l . t x 
IM1AS 32.9X 43. 12 
HCPB 
mow 
W30AR3 18.4X J5.7X 
SHY 
Uf-SiDS 28. OX 1.32 
tt!HEfr (106.5X1 S t .2 * 
See note. to Taois 5 concerning ce r t a i n s i ss i ng data. Figures snown are social returns as siiowi in Taiiie 5, 
civioed in cac i ta l invested, shown :n Table 2, ad justed, shere necessary, tor changes in f isca l year. 
i ,o.=nct a/ai ladle 
m«=negat.YB re turns en negat ive c a p i t a l invested 
Ncisers in o-/entheses are negat ive. 
( 14.711 i 8.571; l 4.4X) ( 37.72) 
47.42 46. Ti 25.11 28. OX 
{ 6,82) 
23.01 11.22 n .a . i 8.31) 
3.02) 6.2X ( 8.02) (157.42) 
79.51 ! 2.52) 5.62 (786.82) 
! 69.92) 
39.52 41.42 41.72 54.02 03.92 
t t t t t H « » i H H t H H « M * 
6.62 ( .12) ( 10.22) ( 5.12) (249.821 
22.32 n.a. n.a, 23,12 9.32 
.42 ( 3.22) ( 7,92i ( 14.12) ( 11.22) 
(221.92) (294,72) * « * » « * * » t * t * t 
m » 
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TABLE 7 CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS BY SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN 
A. FIRMS WHICH HAVE EARNED SUBSTANTIAL RATES OF RETURN 
Chsmelil Sugar Co. 75-04 
Coffee Board of Kenya 64-83 
East African Sugar Industries 74-80 
Horticultural Crops Dev. Auth. 00-84 
Mumuias Sugar Co. 74-84 
3. FIRKS WHICH HAVE EARNED LOU RATES OF RETURN, BUT HAVE 
LARGELY FUNCTIONED UITHOUT RECOURSE TO GOVERNMENT SUBVENTION 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
Kenya Tea Development Authority 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board 
C. FIRMS WHICH HAVE RUN CHROMIC DEFICITS REQUIRING 
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Cotton Lint & Seed Marketing Board 
Kenya Meat Commission 
Maize Marketing Board 
Maize and Produce Board 
National Cereals and Produce Board 
Nzoia Sugar Co. 
Sony Sugar Co. 
Uplands Bacon Factory 
Wheat Board of Kenya 
3.3 Efficiency 
One important measure of performance for a firm is its 
efficiency, i.e. how wall it transforms inputs into outputs. 
This can be measured by calculating unit costs1'. Table 8 
shows real unit costs, using the GDP deflator as the measure 
of inflation. The price paid to farmers is excluded. So 
are interest payments, as these are considered to be a 
return to capital, rather than a cost, and whether they are 
high or low is a function of how tha government has chosen 
to finance the firm, and not of how the managers have 
L E 8 , R E A L U N I T C O S T E < I Q O \ Ji t 
i 
7a> S n i I I i HQ s ) 
u n i t s 1943 ilk 5 i?65 1966 1963 196? 1970 1971 1972 1973 
C h E H E l I u Sns/ton n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a, 1,257,9 1,592.3 
CBK Shs/ton 437,0 378.8 442.6 395.2 381.2 456,4 436.7 303,0 717.0 681.3 466.9 
CliSffB Shs/ton 279.1 223.2 767.3 7<9.1 754.4 351,4 436.2 499,3 469.5 335.7 1,233.4 
E A S I Sns/ton n, a. rv.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a. ft* n.a. 
KCC Shs/ton 234,9 263,6 3 iv .O 366.5 352.7 396.8 409.0 468,4 567,2 900.8 457,3 
KMC Sns/»d 343.3 347,3 356.0 345,6 353.4 326.7 341.2 340.9 337,3 377.8 402.5 
KTDA Sbs/ton 3,368.9 4,203.6 2,877.6 2,224.3 1.821.0 043.3 1,060,3 537.2 666,1 432.7 367,8 
HUB Shs/tor. 192.3 167.5 257,4 227,5 
HiPB Shs/ton 193.2 355.7 313.2 131,3 136,6 ->• 2 106,1 
MHtifiB Shs/ton 637.3 
NCPB Shs/ton 
\Z0IA Shs/tor 
PYBOASD Sris/tor 3 ,964.1 4,241.2 4,726.5 3,413.0 2,445.9 2,791.7 3,802.9 4,112.0 3,961.0 2,549,8 3,390.8 
BON* Shs/ton 
UPLANDS Sns/pig 321.3 332.9 321,9 305.0 399.3 391.6 359,1 363.5 397,4 505.6 525,2 
W H E A T Shs/ton n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n .a . n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. 142,8 
1974 1975 [VA 1977 197S 1979 • i?3v 1981 • 1282 m 128* 
C H E H E L I L S i s / t o n 1,350.9 1,095.8 963.0 875.4 947,3 980.4 304=2 962.1 1,134.4 934.7 310,7 
C F K Shs/ton 296.6 367,6 351.9 7 www« i. 490.5 487.6 >372.6 404.2 465.6 425.5 n,a, 
CLiSftB Shs/ton 1,552.5 2,302.8 2,140.7 1,259.7 1,334.9 1,635.7 1,500,7 1,884.1 1,868.8 n.a. 
E A S I Shs/ton 428.2 773.3 853.9 373.3 705.0 724.7 773.6 1,012,9 1,078.8 678.0 n.a. 
KCC Shs/ton 476.4 607.0 564.4 532.8 6 820.9 1,171.2 1,048,5 916.3 657,1 1,115.2 
KMC Shs/hd 409.3 464.5 373.1 463.6 727.8 719,6 695.2 'V ) E 769.3 n.a. n.a. 
KTDA Shs/ tor 341.6 372,0 334.5 233,5 237.9 256.7 360.3 383,4 379.8 287.9 237.7 
MB Shs/ton 
HiPB Shs/ton 154.7 112.5 175,5 90 . t 170 "K A 1 v.. I J 304,7 450.0' 
KUKIAS Sns/ton 831.2 1,035.4 1,010.7 987.6 888.1 1,229.7 908.4 1,099.5 1.254.2 1,057.0 924.1 
N C P B Shs/ton 253.2 202.4 223.1 241.1 408.3 
NZQIA Sns/ton 3,099.8 1,652 2,000.3 2,271.5 1,966.1 2,536.5 
PYB0A8B Sns/ton 3,713.2 2,190.4 2,110.6 3,678.6 n ,a . 2,962.2 2,513,8 n.a, n,a, 4,656.5 n.a. 
BQRY Shs/ton 1.086,1 2,517,5 2,544,5 2,862.1 
L , 0 I A N D S Sus/pig 496,3 435.9 473.0 440.9 515.3 548.1 C T Q A 591,£ 577,1 C T T J 3«>i. 1 538,7 
W E S T Sns/tcn 156.4 118.9 298. t 146.9 199.8 227.4 87.4 
Costs are seasured exc lus i ve at i n t e r e s t oay ie^ ts a id pay ien ts to arwers, The 83P deflator was used tc arr ive at real 
ccsts. Data «as t a k n fro® the f i r e s ' annual r e p o r t s . 
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performed.^ The costs shown thus include costs incurred by 
the firms for transport, processing, marketing, storage, 
depreciation, administration, etc. The same information is 
shown graphically in Figure 2. 
Unfortunately, we have no good absolute standard by 
which to say whether the firms are efficient or not, as no 
comparable data is available for any other firms in similar 
lines of business, except for the sugar firms, which can be 
compared with each other. 
The firms were classified as good performers if their 
real costs didn't rise significantly, and as poor performers 
if costs rose noticeably faster than inflation. An attempt 
was made to detect general trends in real costs: endpoints 
which were far off the trendline were avoided. A summary of 
the cost trends, together with the classification of 
performance is found in Table 9. 
Every possible typology of performance can be found 
among the 16 firms for which we have time series data on 
unit costs. Of the 16 firms, seven have exhibited fairly 
consistent "good" performance. Five firms have shown 
consistent real cost inflation for the years for which data 
is available. Two firms started out with their costs under 
control, but later experienced significant cost escalation. 
One firm started the period with significant cost 
escalation, which later ended, though it was not reversed. 
If we assume the firm became inefficient during the decade 
in which real costs were rising, then it continued to 
operate inefficiently in the second decade. Two firms, 
«1 f 
».05/1^ 
TABLE 9. SUflhftRV OF TR^NiiS IN REAL UNIT GUSTS 
Y E A R S Aim- % CHNS CLASSIF1 CATION 
CBR 
CL&SiiB 
EASI 
KCC 
KMC 
KTDA 
MMB 
M U M i A S 
NCPB 
N Z O I A 
P V B O A R D 
SONY 
UPLANDS 
WHEAT 
71 -84 
63-83 
63-83 
75-83 
63-84 
63-7J 
71-82 
64- 74 
74-84 
63-66 
67-78 
78-80 
73-84 
80 -83 
79-84 
63-80 
80-84 
63-66 
66-73 
73-84 
73-79 
( 4. 87.) 
< .17.) 
10. OX 
1, 67. 
7, 77. 
( . 47.) 
7. 87. 
i ny \ 
i X . h fu f 
k i.7%) 
8 % 
< . 77.) 
58.8% 
, 4 7 . 
3.97.) 
2.77.) 
1 7 . 0 7 , 
1. 77.) 
8 . .17. 
, 2 % 
8. 17. 
GOOD 
GOOD 
POOR 
GOOD 
POOR 
POOR 
GOOD 
'•OCR 
POOR 
GOOD 
POOR 
POOR 
GOOD 
PCJR 
POOR 
POOR 
Numoers in parentheses ars negative. 
Years were chosen to show reprsssrttative trends. Encccnnfcs 
• t1 the trend 1 i ne wer3 avci ded 
Nzoia and the NCPB were classified as poor per-formers 
because the level at their costs were-high, though the 
trends were -f avorab i. e. 
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was so high that it was classified as a poor performer. 'Je 
can simplify the classification and say that there were 
seven firms which performed well, and nine that were 
performing poorly by the end of the period. 
From Tables 3 and 9 we can si e when cost escalation 
l 
problems began in those firms which have been classified as 
poor performers. lie have data from independence for eight 
firms. Of those, six underwent a major shift ir 
orientation, from serving relatively small numbers of large 
scale white settler farmers to serving much larger numbers 
of small-scale African farmers. Of these six firms, four 
made the transition without any significant increase in unit 
qn impressive achievement. Those who made this 
successful transition were the Coffee Board, the KI1C, the 
Pyrethrum Hoard, and Uplands Bacon, 
The Maize Marketing Board experienced real cost 
increases of 5.0% p. a.. from 1963 until it was disbanded in 
1956. l/hile such cost increases would surely be 
unacceptable over the long run, one could perhaps ascribe 
them to genuinely greater costs of serving smallholders. In 
any case, after maize marketing was reorganized under the 
Maize and Produce Board the upward trend in real unit costs 
for maize marketing ended, though occasional bad years 
" "> the transition to independence and smallholder 
orientation for maize marketing could be considered as 
moderately successful. 
Two firms began to suffer severe cost escalation from 
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independence, the I'CC and the Cotton Board. The former's 
problems must have begun with difficulties in reoriantstion . 
It's real costs rose at double digit rates from independence 
and havo hardly slowed since then. Likewise, the Cotton 
Board has suffered real cost escalation averaging 10% p.a. 
for two decades. 
Twt> other firms began to experience cost escalation 
during the first decade of independence, Uplands Bacon in 
1965 and the XI1C in 1971. Both firms lost expatriate 
managers at the time, both were in the livestock industry 
and developed severe supply problems. Both firms currently 
face vigorous competition from the private sector; it is 
possible that the supply problems date from the introduction 
of that competition. Unfortunately that information is not 
readily at hand. 
The next firms to develop significant cost escalation 
problems were the grain trading firms, the VJheat Board in 
1977 and the Maize 8 Produce Board in 1970. These two were 
reorganized in 1930 into the national Cereals and Produce 
Board, whose real costs were stable from 1980-33. The steep 
rise in costs in 1934 must be due at least in part to the 
drought and resulting famine, which is why 1934 has been 
excluded from the calculation of the trend. 
Two firms were started with high unit costs, Mzoia 
Sugar Co., which began operating in 1979 and South Hyanza 
Sugar Co., which began operation in 1930. Both firms' early 
performance was hurt by severe undercapitalization at 
inception and by unfavorable management contracts with 
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expatriate managing agents. The management agreement for 
Hzoia was terminated and real unit costs have been brought 
down about 18%. Sony remains in the hands of managing 
agents and its performance has gone from bad to worse. 
Of the 15 firms, three were firms which handled crops 
which were almost entirely exported. All three of these 
firms were good performers. Two firms served markets which 
had both substantial export and domestic consumption; both 
o 
were poor performers. 0 Eleven firms served primarily the 
domestic market; of these four were good performers and 
seven were poor. So it seems that there are greater 
pressures on management of export oriented firms to perform 
well. There are several possible explanations for this. 
One is that there is no possibility of financing 
inefficiency by pushing up consumer prices. At the sajne 
time the government is probably less willing to finance 
losses of export firms because it could be perceived as 
subsidizing foreign consumers, which obviously has a lower' 
political priority than does subsidizing local consumers. 
Finally, foreign exchange supplies are sufficiently 
important that if supplies are threatened by inefficient 
management, ••he situation is unlikely to be allowed to 
persist. 
3.4 Who benefits from parastatal operations? 
At this point we can integrate the above information on 
social rates of return and efficiency with information on 
producer prices, shown in Table 10, and consumer prices, 
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found in Tabl? 11 to ask: ''ho have been the prime 
beneficiaries of each fi-ra, and at whose expense have they 
benefited? 
The methodology fo" answering the question is as 
follows. If the social rate of return is high then we 
conclude that the "shareholders" have benefited, and 
conversely. If real unit costs have risen significantly, we 
conclude that the firm's nanagers have increasingly 
9 
benefited. If real consumer prices have fallen, consumers 
have increasingly benefited. Conversely, if real consumer 
prices have risen, consumers have subsidized someone else's 
1 0 
benefits. Likewise, if real producer prices have risen, 
producers have increased their share of the benefits, and 
conversely. 
Several important caveats must be mentioned which 
qualify the simple application of this methodology. First, 
the only absolute measure of benefits is the rate of return. 
The other measures of benefits only give changes in 
distribution of benefits; we need further information to say 
if the distribution of surplus favors managers, producers or 
consumers. Such information might include costs from 
comparable firms which would permit us to measure efficiency 
absolutely. Likewise, import parity prices could show 
whether consumers are paying world market prices, are being 
subsidized, or are subsidizing other parties through high 
prices. 
Second, the term "shareholders" has been used loosely 
I D G / w e 4 3 5 
T A 8 L E 1 0 . T R E N D S I N P R O D L ' C c R P R I C E S 
m m 1 ^ 6 
Sugarcane Sns/H'O Kg 
Uhole S i ts / l i t re .46 ,49 .55 ,59 
cs* Shs/ton 5,909.9 6,471.9 6,337.6 5,949.9 
KTDA Shs/tcn 1,15; ,3 1,030,3 1,144,3 1,125,5 
CLScSHB Sns/100 Kg 132.6 123,2 140.2 132,7 
6fi& Beet Shs/kg 2.64 2.73 2.83 3,08 
4th grace beet 3hs/»g 1,37 1.94 2.05 2.2 
Wheat Sns/100 I'c 52,0 54,5 
!teize Sns'lOO i<g 32.35 36.19 35.53 40,07 
Rice 5ns/100 kg 
PYBCAftS Shs/ton 3,692,6 3,797,5 4 , i87 .0 4,656.2 
Shs/nd 23 i ,8 2.13. i 216.8 217.6 
deflator 1976=100.0 49,0 49,1 58.3 49.6 
iv67 m 12&2 1970 i m mi m 
4.5 5,0 5.2 
K7 m l ,59 .52 ,53 .69 ,77 .7? 
5,284.7 5,936,7 5,541.3 7,332,6 5,633,0 7,135.4 3,674,4 
,,145.3 953.4 934.2. 1,035.2 1,111,5 1,035.2 97S.6 
136.5 149.7 134.6 123.! 132.2 128,1 120,7 
3.23 3, OB 3,41 3,49 4,06 4,43 4,77 
2,31 2,31 2.4 2.38 2,47 2,43 
56.8 56.3 54.5 45,1 50.6 50.6 56.7 
35.26 35,3 27.55 27.5 33,33 3B.B? 3c. 85 
48.35 50.33 50.14 
4,794,6 3,913.7 3,349.0 3,463.6 4,397,6 5,090,3 5.369.3 
251,8 267.5 239,3 232.2 225.7 270.3 290.3 
50,7 51.6 52,1 53,5 56,1 60,4 66.C 
/ 
1974 12Z§ m m 1975 i !22 i f i o 1281 1282 1233 
Sugarcane 6.2 3.9 10.5 12,7 13.3 13.3 13,3 14.5 17,0 22,7 
til Ik ,77 .85 1.05 1.32 1,32 1.32 1,46 1.85 2,15 2,15 
CBK 9,750.4 9,303,4 22,073.4 39,189.5 25,738.0 26,083.0 24.644.1 21 ,120.4 27,641.0 34,640.8 
KTDA 1,211,3 1,397.5 1,597.7 3,424,1 2,376.3 2,335.4 2.752,4 2 ,503.3 2,617.3 3,641,6 
CJS1B 122.3 210,3 221.3 160.3 322.6 327,0 295.0 348,0 301.3 
SAG Beef 5,29 5.93 6.68 7.47 8.23 8.51 9.65 10.43 15.2 16.31 
4th grade ceef 3.64 4.12 4,18 4.54 5,37 5.39 6,21 6.93 8.05 8.44 
wheat 30.4 104.7 120.3 133.3 133.3 143.6 163.9 166,7 187,6 222,2 
liaize 46.43 69.79 76.59 88.89 38.89 83.39 95,37 100 107.74 153,9 
Sice 56,64 104.49 136,38 136 144,85 150,33 150,44 147.96 150,07 173 
P\BCA?,D 5,858.9 5,736,0 6,206,8 7,057,5 r.,a, 10,170.3 11,933.2 fi.a. n.a, 18,483.7 
34 i ,6 453.3 435.7 491.6 493.4 513,0 600.9 ? 30,6 1,024,2 
35° ceflater 77.9 86.0 100.0 118.0 121,9 128,1 140.5 154.7 170.2 182.6 
SCIflCESi Data l i s t ed oy f i r » naae ccaes t ra» tne anraal r s o c t s tor that f;rn. 
Date l is ter ! by co-nodity coses * r 0 i t the S t a t i s t i c a l Abstract, various years. 
- 3 3 -
A B l E 1 1 . T R E N D S Tiv C O N S u h & R P R * C x E 
12?3 mi 126-2 1266 iW m 1252 12ZO 12Z1 1222 12Z3 
S>jgar Kg 1.47 1,47 1,47 1,54 1.54 1,54 1.55 1.55 1,65 1,65 1.35 
Mil: 1/2 l i t e r .65 .65 . / .7 .7 .7 .7 .75 ,75 ,6 ,6 
Coffee 1/2 Kg 8.33 3,33 3.25 8,26 7,97 7.3 7,13 7.75 8 n - i t 0 a ixi 9 
Tea 1/2 Ko 5,64 5.79 5.74 5.75 5,66 5.63 5,96 6.C2 6.44 6,44 7,06 
Printed cotton heter 3,37 3.29 3,29 3 . /5 0,52 3,35 3.53 3.5 3.5 10,5 
8sR-io« grace <5 3.43 3,5 3,74 3,96 4,56 4.56 5.27 5.34 5.67 5.84 6.4 
Beet-high qrane Kg 6.73 1.2b 3.1 8,48 9,87 9,37 10,32 11,76 i l 11 12,26 
snsat f lour Kg 1.21 1.21 4 ' X T A, 1 1,32 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.33 1.33 1.34 1.35 
•laizs fiGlir Kg .59 .57 .84 ,33 .77 ,77 .55 .55 ,55 ,7 .7 
jtice. local <5 2.2 2.11 2,^9 2,42 2.2 1.76 1,75 1.65 1,65 1,65 1,65 
i P Deflator 49,0 49.1 4B.8 49,6 50.7 51.6 52.1 53/5 56.1 60,4 66.0 
m im 12Z5 1974 12ZZ 12ZI 12Z2 1280 1281 12S2 12§3 
Sugar Kg 2.4 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4,5 4.5 4,84 5.75 6,3 
Bilk 1/2 l i te . ' ,8 .95 .95 1,24 1.3 1,3 1.33 1,63 1,95 2.13 
Coffee 1/2 Kg 16.02 16,32 17.64 22,45 53.12 53,7 60.56 61.19 79.02 83.96 
Tea 1/2 Kg 7.02 7.11 7,05 7.79 7.11 7.29 7.44 8.44 12,15 13.97 
Printed cotton Keter 13.75 ' 14.5 14,5 15.19 19,19 22,67 24 24 29.17 39.5 
Beef-low grade 6,4 7.4 7.4 8,2 10.13 10.52 13 13,22 15.6 13.44 
Beef-high grade Kg 12.6 13-33 15,06 15,32 i9,47 19,73 25.46 25.49 32.38 39.45 
'*heat f lour Kg 2 ( 2.5 2.52 2.74 2,79 2,83 3.12 3.45 4.21 4.51 
raize f lour Kg ,95 1.19 1.2 1.51 1.45 1.46 1.65 1.65 1.92 2.3 
Kite, local Kq 2,25 3 3.06 3 3.32 4.48 4.29 5,72 7,56 3,17 
SDP Debater 77.9 66,0 100.0 118,0 121.9 126.1 140.5 154,7 170.2 162,6 
SOKE; Stat ist ical abstract, various years , 
\ 
l 
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to represent the state in its role of entrepreneur. The 
firms in the sample operate under several different 
arrangements in this regard. Some operate under the 
Companies Act, have share capital, and pay dividends out of 
profits. Others have no such share capital, and surpluses 
earned are retained. The definition we have used of social 
returns to capital includes not only profits, but also 
interest payments and excise and export taxes. It may be 
misleading to speak of the retention and reinvestment of 
surpluses in the same way as the payment of interest or 
excise taxes, since the former presumably benefits the other 
members of the coalition, probably suppliers or managers, 
while the latter benefits the Treasury, and hence the 
Republic as a whole. Thus it is desirable to exanine the 
disposition of social returns as well as their magnitude. 
This distinction is less important where the returns are 
negative. In that case the demand is made for infusions of 
capital, and whether as interest free loans or as additional 
equity subscriptions, the effect on the firm and the 
Treasury is equivalent. 
Third, there are limits to how far one party can push 
the operations of tire firm in its own favor, limits arising 
from the fact that all parties® participation is necessary 
for the firm's continued operation. For example, if 
management inflates costs too much, at the expense of the 
farmers who supply the firm, the supplies will dry up, 
leaving managers with a big share of a small pie. The same 
can happen if any of the parties is pushed too far. Such a 
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situation of over-reaching may not be easily recognized 
using the proposed methodology. 
Fourth, the equation of increased unit costs with 
benefits to management is an oversimplification. The 
assumption being made is that there are two primary reasons 
for real cost escalation, managerial corruption and 
managerial incompetence. In the first case managers are 
clearly the beneficiaries, since they have pocketed the 
increased costs, whether as cash, goods and services, or the 
building of a patronage network, In the second case the 
managers are also beneficiaries, since they are being paid 
to do jobs for which they are unqualified. There are, of 
course, other reasons for unit cost escalation. Drought may 
be one, if it causes lower recovery rates, as in sugar or 
pyrethrum processing. Another may be when a firm is 
compelled to provide additional services to suppliers, such 
as transport, for which costs are not recovered fron 
suppliers. In such a case there is a disguised transfer of 
benefits to suppliers, one which our methodology is ill-equip 
ped to detect. Another cause of high unit costs, which 
undoubtedly applies to several firms in the sample, is low 
capacity utilisation due to liquidity problems. 
Fifth, the analysis assumes that all other things are 
equal, which, of course they nay not be. Our figures may 
show that producer prices have risen, but if such a rise is 
accompanied by increasingly late payments, or an increase in 
such malpractices as under-measurement of produce delivered, 
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the benefit may be illusory. .'here such other dimensions of 
benefits to one party change materially, the analysis will 
be misleading. 
Sixth, it should be noted that the creation and 
distribution of surplus is a non-zero sun game for Kenyan 
participants, especially with an export crop. If the major 
portion of the product is consumed overseas, and prices are 
set largely independently of the Kenyan market, then there 
is no reason to think that one party's benefits must be paid 
for from another's losses, or that all parties might not 
experience simultaneous increases or decreases in benefits. 
Despite this formidable list of caveats, there is still 
a great dec 1 which can be said about the performance of 
agricultural parastatals, and the distribution of costs and 
benefits. Let us consider each firm in turn. 
S u ga r Sector 
Data on sugar firms' operations begins in 1971, so we 
begin the analysis from then. From 1971 to 1976 real 
consumer sugar prices rose at a rate of 8.9% p.a. while real 
producer sugar prices rose 5.5% p.a. Thus during this 
period producers were increasingly being favored at the 
expense of consumers, with a bit left over to benefit 
someone else. In contrast, from 1976 to 19C3, real consumer 
sugar prices fell 3.7% p.a., while producer prices continued 
to rise, at the slower rate of 2.4% p.a. Thus for each firm 
we wish to determine who absorbed the increasing margin 
between consumer and producer prices in the 1971-76 period, 
and who suffered the squeeze since 1976. 
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C h e rj e 1 i 1 
Chemelil's social rate of return ros$ steadily through 
the early period, reaching 52% by 1975. During that period 
unit costs fell by 9.1% p.a. Clearly shareholders and 
suppliers gained at tha expense of consumers and managers. 
During the 1975-33 period, the social rate of return 
fell noticeably, though it remained hijh, while real unit 
costs crept up at about 1% per year. Thus the main 
conclusion is that both consumers and producers gained at 
the expense of shareholders, with management also gaining, 
but to a negligible degree. 
Bast African Su^ar Industries 
In EASI real unit costs nearly doubled from 1974 to 
1976, though they remained the lowest in the sugar industry 
in 1976. Meanwhile, the social rate of return hovered in 
the 35% range, high, but lower than that achieved by 
Chenelil. 
During the 1976-33 period, EASI's real unit costs 
stayed rock steady, rising only 0.4% p.a., and F.A3I retained 
its position as the lowest unit cost sugar producer in the 
industry in 1933. EASI showed very high rates of return in 
the late '73's, over 50% p.a., which fell to much more 
moderate levels in the 1900's. Thus the benefits paid to 
producers and consumers in the 1976-33 period have come at 
the expense of shareholders. 
'iumias S u p, a r Co. 
i '• > 
At Muraias real unit costs drifted up by about 14% 
between 1973 and 1976, putting them about 17% above those of 
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Chemelil and EASI. During the same period the rate of 
return rose to about 45%. Thus management and shareholders 
seem to have shared the benefits of the increasing spread 
between consumer and producer prices. 
During the 1976-03 period real unit costs remained 
steady, creeping upward only during the effects of the 
drought of the early '00's. P.ates of return fell in the 
late '70's, but climbed back upward in the 'OO's, reaching 
the prodigious rate of 03.9% for 1904. 
ilzoia Sugar Co. 
Nzoia began operations in 1970, so has only operated in 
a period of increasing squeeze on the sugar firms. From 
1979-03 its real unit costs declined by about 12% p.a., 
though they remain high in comparison with the older sugar 
companies'. The decline in unit costs has not been enough 
to protect the rate of return, which has been negative every 
year except 1900. 
South ilyanza Sugar Company 
Like Ilzoia, Sony is a newcomer on the scene, beginning 
operations only in 1900. When it began operations its unit 
costs were within the range of those of the established 
firms. However, from 1900-03 real unit costs shot up at a 
rate of 30% p.a., making Sony management far and away the 
worst in the industry, with unit costs more than double 
those of the older firms. This extravagant bad management 
came at the expense of shareholders, as social returns have 
been consistently negative. 
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Coffee Board of Kenya s 
The Coffee Board has gone through three distinct 
periods. During the first decade of independence, real 
producer prices were volatile, but untrended. Real consumer 
prices fell about 24%, while real unit costs rose 7% from 
1963 to 1973. 
In the coffee boom years of 1974-79 everyone benefited 
except local consumers, for whom real prices shot up at more 
than 15% p.a. This, combined, of course, with high prices 
overseas, allowed real producer prices to rise about 10% 
p.a.(though at their peak they went higher), real unit costs 
to grow at about the same rate, and the social rate of 
return to exceed 200% p.a. for three years running. 
In the years since the coffee boom, the social rate of 
return has never fallen below 100%, and again surpassed 200% 
in 1903. This has been achieved at the expense of 
producers, whose real unit price has fallen 7% from 1979 
levels; consumers, who pay 10% more; and managers, since 
real unit costs have been brought down 13%. 
Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board 
The history of the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing 
Board is one of cost increases. From 1964-74, real unit 
costs grew seven-fold. From 1974-03 they' rose another 20%. 
In the first period, up to 1974, real producer prices 
declined, falling 40% over the decade. Since then they have 
been held more or less steady, with some fluctuation. Local 
cotton consumers didn't suffer real cost increases in the 
period 1964-71. However, from 1971-83 real prices to 
-40- IDS/5..'? 435 
consumers for printed cotton cloth have increased 350%. 
Probably some of the responsibility for this staggering 
increase lies with the textile firms who manufacture cloth 
using locally grown cotton. Unfortunately the data needed to 
sort out these margins is not readily available. The Cotton 
Board has never yielded any substantial rate of return. Not 
surprisingly, it did best in the years 1971-74 when both 
producers and consumers were being squeezed. 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
The history of the I'CC is also one of cost increases. 
Real unit costs rose 70% from 1964-73, the increase being 
more or less evenly spread over the years. Since 1973 real 
unit costs have continued to rise, more than doubling in 
that period. In the years 1964-80 managers were joined as 
beneficiaries by consumers, to whom real prices fell by 26%, 
while real producer prices stagnated. The increasing 
benefits to managers and consumers came at the expense of 
shareholders, who seldom got even a decent return and 
sometimes sustained large losses. After 1979 producers 
received an increase in prices, amounting to about 14% in 
real terms, while consumer prices rose 19% in real terms. 
During this period shareholders also benefited, achieving 
rates of return which more than covered the opportunity cost 
of capital for the first time. These favorable results for 
producers, managers, and shareholders were largely financed 
by the school milk program, which increased demand by about 
a third, at a time of substantial real price increases. 
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Kenya ii'eat COP.mission 
A distinct brea!: in performance of the K'iC occurred 
around 1971. Before that real unit costs were contained, 
shareholders enjoyed a modest but positive rate of return, 
producers enjoyed real price increases from 15-30%, 
depending on grade. These benefits were financed by 
consumers who faced real price increases in the range of 40-
50%, depending on grade. 
After 1971, real unit costs began a steady march 
upward, partially, but not lastingly, arrested in 1976. By 
1982 real unit costs were more than double the level of 
1971. The pressure on profits was supplemented by pricing 
policy: real consumer prices fell nearly three times as fast 
as real producer prices until 1977. Since 1977 this 
fiscally dangerous price trend has bee reversed; both real 
consumer and real producer prices have risen, the former 
much faster than the latter. However, these attempts to 
save the K1IC through favorable pricing policies have failed. 
Unit costs have risen 65% since 1977, while volumes have 
shrunk due to competition from the private sector. The 
resulting large chronic losses have completely eroded the 
capital base of the XilC. It has been illiquid almost 
continually since 1974. By 1902 short term liabilities 
exceeded total assets. 
Kenya Tea Development Authority 
The most impressive fact about the performance of the 
Kenya Tea Development Authority is the relentless decline in 
real unit costs, a decline which averaged about 13% p.a. for 
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two decades, a decline not even reversed during the coffee 
boon. Just as managers' benefits have been held down, so 
too returns to capital have been small or negative 
throughout nearly the entire period, including the coffee 
boom. Local consumers were allowed to reap some of the 
benefit of this restraint on managers and shareholders, as 
real consumer prices fell by about half from 1964 to 1901, 
since which time they have climbed rather steeply. 
With extreme restraint of the interests of managers and 
shareholders, and with local consumers constituting only a 
small share of the market, producers were left to face the 
vagaries of world tea markets. Real producer prices 
d e c l i n e d 17% f r o m 2 9 5 4 - 6 9 . S i n c e than they have f l u c t u a t e d , 
reaching a peak in 1977, but apparently averaging at levels 
attractive to farmers, as supply has grown steadily over the 
period. 
Pyrethrum Board of e n y a 
The performance of the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya has 
been dominated by world market conditions. Stiff 
compet it ion from synthetics caused real producer prices to 
fall about 16% from 1964-70, since then fluctuating at 
higher levels. Real unit costs have fluctuated widely, but 
not shown an upward trend. The Board earned low to moderate 
rates of return throughout the period. 
Kenya's share in the world market for pyrethrum exceeds 
that in any other crop, so it must aborb much of the 
fluctuation in the world market. The Pyrethrum Board 
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liquidity levels h3ve proven inadequate to finance stocks 
which could even out demand, so suppliers experienced severe 
shocks in the early 19G0's when supply temporarily exceeded 
demand. Because of missing data it is hard to be any more 
specific than this. 
Wheat Board of Kenya 
Wheat pricing policies from 1973-80 guaranteed that 
the Wheat Board would run into financial problems, since 
real consumer prices rose only 8% while real producer prices 
rose 35% in the same period. The squeeze on returns to 
capital was exacerbated because real unit costs were allowed 
to rise by 6C% in the 1973-79 period. Although the Wheat 
3oard started the period with high rates of return, they 
were quickly eroded and the Board ended its existence with 
large accumulated losses and even larger debts to the 
Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation. 
Haize Marketing Board 
From 1963 to 1966 real maize prices rose rapidly, about 
14% p.a. for consumers and about 6.4% p.a. for producers. 
Cost control was erratic and social returns were-highly 
negative. Apparently producers and managers enjoyed 
benefits at the expense of consumers and shareholders. 
Maize and Produce ^.oard 
After the creation of the Maize and Produce Board, tlie 
balance between maize producers and consumers reversed, with 
" • • t . . " • • • 
real producer prices falling by 15% from 1967-71 while real 
consumer prices fell 35%. The trends in consumer and 
producer prices for rice followed similar patterns. Cost 
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control was still erratic, especially in 1968 and 1969, but 
effective overall. Rates of return to capital varied from 
moderate to high. 
In the period from 1971 to 1976 the balance between 
maize producers and consumers was reversed again. Real 
consumer maize prices rose 22.4%, real producer prices by 
about 29%. The Board continued to experience intermittent 
cost control problems, with spikes in unit costs in 1974-76. 
Rates of return were volatile, fluctuating from -14.7% to 
+26.3%. The pattern for rice was similar, but more prone to 
causing the board financial problems: Real consumer rice 
prices rose 4% while real producer prices shot up almost 
60%. 
In the period from 1976-00 management was the big 
gainer, at the expense of producers and shareholders. Real 
unit costs increased by 156% in a four year period, while 
real producer prices for maize fell by 11% and for rice by 
22%. Rates of return were consistently negative. Consumers 
came out undamaged, as real consumer prices fell marginally. 
national Cereals and Produce Board 
Since the NCP3 was created in 1900 producers have "been 
favored over consumers. Real consumer prices of maize rose 
7% from 1980-03, during which time the real consumer price 
of wheat rose 11% and rice by a massive 46%. However, these 
consumer price rises were inadequate to finance the real 
price increase to maize producers of 24%, with wheat 
producers receiving a 4% increase. Iv ice producers helped to 
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finance the benefits to maize and wheat producers, as their 
real producer price fell 9%. Real unit costs were fairly 
steady in the period 1930-33, but unfavorable price trends 
ensured that the NCP3 would make large losses every year. 
Uplands Bacon Factory 
During the period 1964-7G the management of Uplands 
took an increasing share of benefits, at the expense of 
suppliers and shareholders. During that period real unit 
costs rose at a rate of 3.2% p.a. Real producer prices fell 
a bit, around 7% between 1964.and 1971. They recovered in 
the mid 1970's, fut fell again in the late 1970's, During 
most of this period rates of return hovered in the single 
digits, turning negative at the end of the period. During 
this period pig supplies declined from a peak of 60,245 in 
1971 to less than 40,000 from 1973-7?,. After 1973 cost 
control improved and real costs rose only 3.3% between 1973 
and 1933. An attempt was made to increase pig supplies by 
raising real producer prices by 33% during the period. This 
effort was unsuccessful, and supplies fell to less than 
15,COO by 1933, and returns were strongly negative. 
Unfortunately, data on consumer pork prices is not readily 
available to complete the picture, but it seems clear that 
management has been the only party to benefit significantly 
from Uplands' operations. 
4. Conclusions 
4.1 Performance of agricultural parastatals 
The first conclusion which stands out is that the 
current fashion in some circles of speaking in blanket terms 
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of how poorly parastatals perform is ill-founded. In the 
agricultural sector in Kenya there have been seven firms 
which have performed well, some for two decades since 
independence. All have served large numbers of sma11holder 
farmers, a role which requires a fairly large and complex 
organization, which makes the success achieved all the more 
impressive. Several of the firms have weathered unfavorable, 
market conditions, both domestic and international, but 
unfavorable external conditions have not resulted in 
institutional decay. 
Second, those who view expatriate managers either as a 
panacea for, or the main cause of, management problems in 
parastatals are mistaken. Ample examples can be found of 
both good and bad managers, both African and expatriate. 
There is no alternative which can substitute for the 
government playing a strong role in recruiting, appointing 
and retaining good managers. The best which can be hoped 
for from the use of expatriates is to buy time while a 
proper training program is put into place, a program which 
will require continued supervision and support from 
government. The Kenya government lias accumulated a good 
deal of successful experience in this area over the years. 
Presumably if the political will was there the lessons 
learned could be applied to the other parastatals with good 
results. 
Third, the successful experience of these seven firms 
calls into serious question the current government approach 
to parastatai problems, which is to try to increase the 
-47- IDS/5..'? 435 
control of central government over all aspects of parastatal 
operations. The seven firms succeeded over long periods 
without the kind of detailed scrutiny of budgets which is 
now being attempted, without having their access to capital 
tightly controlled by the Treasury, without having terms and 
conditions of service set to correspond with those of the 
civil service. Undoubtedly one can find examples of abuses 
by management in these firms, but overall they have 
delivered good results. It seems likely that the good 
results achieved would have been substantially less had the 
I 
type of policies now being attempted been in force all 
along. 
Fourth, the firms operated under two different types of 
pricing regimes, which gave different results. The first 
type will be called a "free pricing regime," and it applied 
to the export crop parastatals. All four of these firms 
sold their products at whatever price world markets would 
bear, and passed on the proceeds to their suppliers, after 
deducting enough margin to cover the firms® costs. This is 
quite different from the "fixed pricing regime" under which 
the other 13 firms operated, whereby the firms bought and 
sold their produce at prices set'by the government. 
The open pricing regime has some obvious advantages 
over the fixed pricing regime. It makes it virtually 
impossible for a firm to lose large amounts of money, since 
producer prices become the residual, instead of profits. 
Since a portion of the producer price is paid as bonuses 
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after the crop has been marketed, liquidity problems are 
also less likely. The success of the open pricing regime 
obviously depends on good managers; if management began 
deducting larger and larger margins producer prices could 
fall to levels which endangered supplies. 
Implicit in the use of the free pricing regime is the 
political decision that producers will bear the full risks 
of the market and will not be subsidized either by consumers 
or by shareholders. Under a free pricing regime the 
opportunities for using a parastatal to redistribute wealth 
on a regional or other basis are limited. Thus there is a 
political cost in switching to a free pricing regime, in 
that it may mean the end of cross-subsidization. 
While a free pricing regime clearly contributes to 
parastatal solvency, it doesn't follow that such a regime is 
appropriate for all the other firms. Where a firm dominates 
i 
the domestic market for a foodstuff, it would be undesirable 
to leave it to operate with instructions to maximize returns 
from sales, as is done in a free pricing regime. 
The fifth conclusion is that there is a strong 
correlation between efficiency and financial performance. 
In earlier sections we have identified those firms which 
have experienced problems with either aspect of their 
performance. Table 12 lists the troubled firms in 
chronological order of the appearance of their problems. It 
can be seen at a glance that all the firms suffered both 
problems. Furthermore, in virtually every case, it was cost 
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TABLE 12 FIRMS >1171 TROUBLES, BY TYPE AITD DATE OF IHCEPTIO'T 
Meg. profit Cost control 
Maize Marketing Board 1953 1953 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries 1977 1963 
Cotton Lint " Seed Marketing 1978 1963 
Uplands Bacon Factory 1978 1966 
Kenya Meat Commission 1977 1971 
Maize and Produce Board 1976 1976 
Wheat Board of Kenya 1977 1975 
r! z o i a Sugar Co. 1979 1979 
Sony Sugar Co. 1930 1980 
National Cereals and Produce 1980 1980 
MOTI^: Years were chosen when persistant trends began. 
Isolated years of negative profit or high cost may have 
occured previously. 
control problems which occurred first, with financial 
problems coming later. There are few if any cases where a 
parastatal was squeezed into insolvency solely or even 
mainly by unrealistic pricing policies. This is not to say 
that price control has always functioned smoothly. There 
have been periods of unsustainable trends, as well as 
periods of unjustified delay in price adjustment. But 
overall the temptation to use price control as a mechanism 
to hand out something to everyone, or as a substitute for 
anti-inflation policies, has been avoided. Instead, the 
problem seems to have been one of poor management which has 
been allowed to persist long enough to land the firm in 
serious financial problems from which it cannot extricate 
itself. 
4.2 Government response to parastatal performance problems 
The state has not often succeded in reversing problems 
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with parastatal performance when they have occurred. Most 
of the firms found in Table 12 have had inefficient 
management which has persisted over long periods, sometimes 
persisting through several rounds of sacking and replacement 
of managers. Given the evidence that the main problem is 
inability on part of government to reverse inefficient 
management when it occurs, what can be said about current 
government policies which are aimed at improving parastatal 
performance? \7e offer several comments. The tolerance 
which has been shov/n toward development of private sector 
alternatives has had positive results which open up new 
options to governiaent. IIowever, policies directed at 
parastatals per se have been misdirected and have had 
negative effects. They have been too focussed on control 
mechanisms of an accounting and approval nature, and have 
been over-ambitious, so that government is severely over-
extended in its ability to apply the controls it has. The 
focus should instead be on recruiting and appointing good 
managers and establishing procedures which allow them to 
manage the firms efficiently. The practice of neglecting 
investment in parastatals until they are starved for working 
capital and on the verge of collapse has been counter-
productive. Each of these points will be amplified in turn. 
There has been considerable tolerance for the 
develooment of private sector alternatives to several of the 
\ 
most troubled agricultural parastatals. This has resulted 
in a decline in the market share of several, including the 
KMC, Uplands, the XCC and the i!CP3. This development has 
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greatly reduced the negative impact of parastatal 
perfornancs, in that producers and consumers have not been 
held ransom to the interests of inefficient parastatals. 
Some of the development of the orivate sector has been 
manifested publicly and officially, such as licensing of 
competitors to ICIiC and Uplands. i.'uch has occurred through 
the development of semilegal or illegal parallel markets, 
including large volumes of unlicensed trading in milk and 
cereals. 
i 
The government should now reconsider the role of the 
troubled agricultural parastatals, taking full account of 
the possibilities presented to it by the existence of the 
private sector. It is possible for government to pull back 
from the over-extended state in which it finds itself, 
without sacrificing major social objectives. . 
Without pretending to present a complete analysis of 
the operations of the firms involved, it is possible to 
indicate the type of possibilities now available. Consider, 
for example, the role of the government in the cereals 
markets. The main objectives of government are to ensure 
adequate supplies of cereals and their proper distribution. 
At independence the transport and distribution sectors were 
underdeveloped compared with today, and were dominated by 
non-citizens. Hence it was appropriate at that time for the 
government to take responsibility through the maize and 
wheat boards to see that grain was distributed through all 
parts of the Republic. How, however, tiere is a transport. 
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sector which is dynamic, competitive, and locally owned, and 
which is playing a major role in transporting and 
distributing cereals. Given that the parastatal cereal 
firms have had chronic problems organizing distribution of 
cereals, the existence of a competitive and efficient 
private distribution sector should be welcomed as a positive 
development. If the role of the ;!CP3 were restricted tc 
maintenance of strategic reserves and importing and 
exporting as appropriate, no important social objectives 
would be sacrificed, but the proper monitoring and 
supervision of the MCPB would become more feasible. Such a 
policy could be implemented in phases, to ensure that the 
results materialized as planned. For example, a first phase 
would be to legalize private trade and transport of grain, 
while the iJCPD continued to distribute grain. As it became 
clear which areas were well served by the private market, 
redundant i!CPB facilities could be divested. 
Similar analyses could find creative ways of adjusting 
the roles of the other troubled parastatals. For example, 
virtually the only role which the KMC still plays is to 
guarantee minimum prices and hence incomes for pastoralists. 
This function might be more effectively served by permitting 
export of pastoralists' livestock* 1, by subsidizing private 
abattoirs to purchase such stock at prices fixed by 
government, by freeing I(i!C of certain restrictions so that 
it could compete more effectively in the more lucrative 
markets for grade cattle, or some combination of these 
policies. Giv"n the existence of a fairly competitive and 
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efficient private sector, the government now has far more 
options than previously, and it can use these options 
without sacrificing the welfare of meat producers and 
consumers, which KMC originally was set up to safeguard. 
There is a further step which government could take 
before major decisions on restructuring of parastatals are 
made or implemented, a step which could make successive 
steps much easier. The government should review the 
financial condition of severely troubled parastatals and 
assume the burden for past losses, leaving the firms with a 
realistic capital structure. This exercise should be 
carried out regardless of whether future decisions on these 
firms will involve restructuring then and retaining them in 
the public sector, sailing- them as going concerns, or 
liquidating them. 
This step is important, because government currently 
seems to be paralyzed from pursuing any of the options, 
since each appears to involve realizing large losses. Of 
course this appearance is illusory--the losses occurred over 
the last decade and will never be recouped. But the 
accounting fiction of carrying the losses on the firms' 
books as debts to be repaid is creating the false impression 
in some circles that it is the act of divestment which 
creates the losses. Similarly, carrying the losses on the 
books unfairly distorts the performance picture of firms 
which will remain in the public sector. Such firms may earn 
a fair return on a realistic capital base, but they are 
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unlikely to be able to make up for years of mismanagement. 
Government has responded to chronic abuses in some 
parastatals by introducing policies which make all 
parastatals more like extensions of the civil service. 
These policies include: the recommendation of the Philip 
Hdegwa committee that senior parastatal officers should be 
1 2 transferable with civil servants ; the freezing of top 
parastatal officers' salaries to bring them into line with 
1 3 
those of the civil service ; the directive issued by 
Treasury that parastatals cannot have access to capital, 
whether it be retained profits or external borrowing without 
specific approval of the government; and the integration of 
parastatal forward and annual budgets with the national 
budget whether or not they depend on funds from the national 
14 
budget . The connection between these policies and the 
view widely held in government that parastatals are and will 
continue to be run by incompetents, was noted by the Waruhiu 
committee.^ 
Clearly, government is incapable of the kind of 
detailed supervision of parastatal operations which it 
professes to be attempting. The parastatal sector employs 
as many people as the civil service, yet there are probably 
fewer than a hundred people in all the branches of the civil 
service whose duty is to supervise parastatals. The 
organization and deployment of these few could not be 
characterized as effective. If this group were to 
concentrate its'efiorts on such obviously necessary tasks as 
assisting parestatals in trouble to set right their 
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operations, providing tinely^ end well thought out policy 
guidance and effective representation on boards of 
directors, providing timely and accurate administration of 
government funds, and talcing notice of parastatals which are 
obviously in great problems, such as ones which go for three 
years without producing any accounts, then a great deal 
would have been accomplished. Given that the government has 
been unable to accomplish these things, such exercises as 
integration of annual budgets must be seen as questionable. 
A major factor which has contributed to the 
intractability of management problems once they develop is . 
the appointment process. All the board members and top 
managers are political appointees. At least in recent years 
the perception has become widespread that the logic of 
parastetal appointments derives only from the larger 
political process of patronage and coalition network 
building, iiost top Managers and board members believe that 
their appointment comes because of who they are and who 
their friends are, not because of how well they manage. In 
such an atmosphere the sacking and' replacement of managers 
becomes ineffective as a control measure. This is extremely 
unfortunate, since the-power of appointment is the single 
most powerful control mechanism available to government. If 
managers aren't competent and energetic, all the audits, 
budget approval processes and procurement procedures in the 
world will not elicit good performance ..rom. parastatals. 
A more productive approach to parastatal appointments 
t 
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•p^ r-a-aj^ a-t-al r>e-i-fcrrtiance. Given the important positive 
benefits which are created by parastatals which perform 
well, it should be possible to mobilize popular political 
support based on the government's record in supplying 
parastatals which run well, support which could be used to 
stave off demands for traditional patronage appointments 
which might erode such performance. Such a system has 
functioned with the export crop parastatals, it should be 
feasible for others. 
The ongoing effort to harmonize salary structures with 
that of the civil service must be seen as a policy to drive 
those possessed of business acumen out of the public sector. 
According to interview data gathered by the author, this 
exodus has clearly begun, though it has not yet proceeded to 
an irreversible stage. A period of general economic 
prosperity will certainly provide the conditions for it to 
accelerate. Other negative aspects of the civil service 
have intruded into parastatal operations. Some managers 
feel themselves tightly constrained by practices such as 
security of tenure of employees which have been carried over 
from the civil service. One manager stated in an interview 
that he could never get rid of an employee, no matter how 
lazy or incompetent the employee might be. With such 
practices it is no wonder that unit costs have remained high 
for years, or that good managers are leaving for the private 
sector. Such policies can be expected to cause the 
appearance of problems in parastatals which have previously 
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run well, and to necessitate recourse to expensive 
management agency and expatriate contracts. 
Since the late 1970's the government has been reluctant 
to invest in the parastatal sector because it realized it 
was over-extended and because further investment was seen as 
throwing good money after bad. In Table 2 it was shown that 
since 1 9 7 § the level of capital invested in several 
agricultural parastatals has sharply declined. Uhile the 
overall direction of this policy is probably wise, its 
implementation has been seriously flawed. The form of 
disinvestment which seems to have been chosen, albeit by 
default, is to allow the parastatals to run out of money. 
Several are near the point of collapse. The decision to 
terminate them has not been taken yet, and their lives have 
been prolonged by infusions of capital which permit them to 
keep operating, but which don't come near to capitalizing 
r. , . , 
them properly. This policy of running the parastntals on 
the verge of collapse must have contributed to poor 
management, demoralizing staff and forcing managers to focus 
on surviving crises rather than on setting up sound long run 
management systems. 
This policy of keeping parastatals undercapitalized 
means that they have run at much less than full capacity, a 
fact which has contributed significantly to high unit costs 
and financial losses. This is apparent in the sugar 
industry, where Ilzoia and Sony were both starved for working 
capital from the beginning. Their resultant inability to 
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pay farmers on tine and to finance adequate cane development 
means that both have been underutilized since their 
inception. Nzoia has averaged 67% capacity utilization, 
while Sony has averaged only 50%. Thus overhead unit costs 
are 50 and 100% higher than necessary, respectively. Since 
both firms were covering variable costs from revenues, 
additional production would have contributed to covering 
overhead costs, even if one assumes that management of these 
firms is inefficient and lilcely to remain so. Thus the 
refusal of government to capitalize these firms adequately 
\ 
must be seen as short sighted and counter-productive. Stich 
short-sightedness is all the more difficult to understand, 
given that funds were v r .'.o :?rori V /orId r^.n": sugar 
rehabilitation lorn. 
4.3 ,n urinary 
The paper has shown that "?oor performance by 
parastatals is far from inevitable. ~Talf the firms 
currently functioning in the agricultural scctor can be 
considered good performers. Government response to poor 
parastatal performance has been misdirected, in that it has 
attempted much greater centralized control of all 
parastatals. Instead, oovarnnent should focus on appointing 
good managers, providing realistic levels of capital, seeing 
that social programs mandated for parastatals are 
realistically provided for, and providing a policy 
environment in which managers are free to manage parastatals 
like businesses. The growt'i of the private sector provides 
government with various options for pulling back from the 
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over-extended state in which it finds itself, without 
sacrificing major policy objectives. If past losses and the 
concomitant debts were assumed by government, it would be 
easier for government to realisticly contemplate the options 
it has. 
4.4 Directions for further work 
There are several directions in which the research 
might profitably be extended. One is to increase coverage 
to include sectors other than agriculture. This extension 
is well under way. 
Other data could be gathered which would strengthen the 
conclusions presented. One obvious set of data which would 
be useful would be comparative cost data from other firms 
which would permit absolute judgements of efficiency, 
instead of the time trends presented here. An obvious 
source for such data would be private sector firms which 
compete with parastatals. Such an exercise would face many 
pitfalls, in that the services and configurations of these 
other firms ;nay not be comparable. This might, of course, 
/ 
provide the opportunity for measuring the cost of certain 
arrangements imposed on parastatals, a worthwhile exercise. 
Uith sufficient investment of time, one could gather 
data which would permit a much more detailed explanation of 
movements in unit costs. Is it overheads or operating costs 
which have risen? Are the reasons controllable by the firm, 
imposed by the market, or due to policies mandated Ly 
government? Do changes observed correspond with such events 
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as changes in management teams? Do other indicators of 
efficiency, such as labor productivity tell the same story 
as that told by trends in total unit costs? 
The issue of the quality and integrity of managers has 
been raised as perhaps the most important factor which has 
spelled the difference between good performance and poor 
performance. It would be worthwhile to examine in more 
detail what are the attributes of successful managers. How 
important is formal education and what training is most 
productive? Wha t effect does civil service experience have, 
and does it matter when in a manager's career the move is 
made from the civil service? What factors are most 
important in job satisfaction for effective parastatal 
managers, and hence essential for the retention of a cadre 
of effective public sector professional managers? 
Finally, there is a need for more in-depth studies of 
the market environments of the various firms, especially the 
most troubled ones. What role does a parastata 1 properly 
serve in a market where there is substantial private sector 
participation? If there are essential social or political 
objectives to be served they must be defined and costed, and 
proper mechanisms set up to permit their satisfaction. If 
the only goal of the firm was to ensure that the market was 
served, and it is well served by other firms while the 
parastatal loses money, then divestiture or liquidation may 
be a sensible answer. 
-5.0- IDS/WP 435 
Note s 
1. The author has incurred many debts of gratitude in the 
course of the research, only a few of which can be 
acknowledged here. Financial support came from the 
Institute for International Studies at University of 
California, Berkeley, and from a Fulbright Doctoral 
Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship. The ambitious 
scope of the research was rade possible only by the generous 
cooperation of the Government Investments Division, of the 
Ministry of Finance, who made available much of the data. 
The author is grateful for the many frank and friendly 
discussions with GID staff. Thanks are also due to the 
staff of the Kenya National Archives and the library of the 
Central 3ureau oi Statistics, whose coll.ections supplemented 
that of the GID. Some of the most interesting moments in 
the research came in the interviews with managers of 
parastatals and the author is grateful for cooperation 
received. John tlordiri drafted the graphs in the paper, 
edited earlier versions, and provided unflagging moral 
s u p p o r t . 
2. Barbara Grosh, "Improving Parastatal Performance: an 
Organizational Approach," IDS -forking Paner No. 409, July, 
1934. 
3. The Kenya Sisal Board was excluded because according to 
one of their own publications, "The Sisal Industry", 1983, 
they are a regulatory board, not a trading corporation. 
4. Attempts have been made throughout to recalculate and 
present the accounts based on common definitions. The most 
common problems in the calculations merit discussion. 
The calculations from the balance sheet (capital 
invested, gearing ratios and current ratios) were generally 
straightforward. Some firms operated more than one set of 
accounts, which needed to be merged to reflect the operation 
of the firm as a whole (example: the results reported for 
the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board reflect a merger of 
the Ordinary and Cotton Price Assistance Funds). 
The calculation of returns to capital involved several 
difficulties. Some of the firms, especially the statutory 
boards, don't present their accounts on a normal commercial 
basis. Profit may be calculated but given a different name, 
such as "surplus." Sometimes, however, the accounting 
concepts used have differed, as when payments tc suppliers 
have been treated as disposal of surplus rather than as an 
expense. Some firms have taken various items straight to 
their balance sheets without having thaw pass through the 
profit and loss statement, one of the hardest practices to 
detect and adjust. The other items needed to calculate 
social returns, that is duties, taxes and .interest payments, 
were not always identified easily. The latter were often 
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listed net of interest received, and it was necessary to dig 
through the detailed notes to the accounts to find actual 
interest payments. 
The most difficult and problematic calculations 
involved unit costs. The intent was to take all costs 
incurred, excluding interest costs and payments to growers, 
and divide by total units. The most common obstacle to this 
is the maintenance of several separate trading accounts with 
only the balance carried to the profit and loss account. 
This practice reached its most extreme in the Maize 
Marketing Board, which used 15 separate operating accounts 
in the space of 6 years, though no more than 6 or 3 accounts 
in any one year. Sometimes the different categories of 
costs are presented in a confusing manner which changes over 
time. In such cases it is easier to calculate total costs 
by subtracting profit from total revenues. Care must be 
taken to include all revenues; other sources of income aside 
from sales of the main product are generally included in the 
section with non-operating costs f rs ther than with revenues. 
Various other problems can occur in any of the 
calculations. Sometimes the firms changed their own 
accounting definitions, necessitating adjustments. For 
example, up to 1963 the F C C treated pool payments as a 
disposal of profits, whereas in later years they were 
treated as an expense item. Sometimes the meaning of 
certain unusual ways of keeping accounts was not described, 
and it must be hoped that the author guessed correctly in 
their interpretation. For example, in the years 1963-65 the 
Pyrethrum Board stated clearly the total payouts to farmers. 
From 1966-70 they only stated clearly the interim payments 
made, with a balance being carried to a current liability 
category called "Growers' accounts." Since no amounts are 
carried over from year to year in that account in those 
years, it was assumed that during those years the balances 
were paid out in final payments. But the presentation for 
the years 1971-83 where interim and final payments are 
clearly specified is much more satisfactory and sure of 
interpretation. Sometimes the level of detail changed 
between years, making it impossible to present the accounts 
in the desired format. For example, between 1969 and 1974 
interest payments by the Pyrethrum Board were subsumed into 
administrative costs, so that data presented on rates of 
return to capital arc not comparable with the same data for 
other years. Fortunately the latter kind of problem, which 
was insoluble, was rare. It is hoped that the former types 
of problems were all caught and dealt with appropriately. 
Details of the calculations are available on request. The 
author welcomes comments from those well acquainted with any 
particular firm's .accounts, which might clarify or correct 
their interpretation v 
5. The definition may seem unsatisfactory when the firms 
misuse the accounting categories. For example, in recent 
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years, some firms have run up large losses which they are 
financing through :,short term" borrowing. In several cases 
these current liabilities amount to more than the total 
assets of the firms, thus the definition used shows negative 
capital invested in the firm, an anomalous concept. 
However, it was judged that the problem is not in the 
definition of capital invested, but rather in the 
classification of liabilities. In the cases cited, there is 
little doubt that the accumulated losses will never be 
repaid, certainly not within one year, as their 
classification in current liabilities implies. In any case, 
the definition shows that disinvestment has occurred in 
these firms, which is an accurate perception, 
6. These measures are not truly definitive, because it is 
a bit tricky to get a meaningful definition of units for 
some firms. For example, to arrive at unit costs for the 
NCPB, it v/as necessary to aggregate tons of all types of 
grains and produce. To the extent that handling costs vary 
between the different products bandied and the composition 
of the aggregate product changed, the results may be 
misleading. Similarly, the KMC and Uplands measure units 
handled it terms of head. It would probably be more 
meaningful had they given kilos of meat produced. While 
these measurement problems are real, it was judged that they 
were not so severe as make it uninteresting to examine the 
degree to which unit costs have been controlled over the 
years since independence. 
7. The same analysis was performed with costs redefined to 
include interest costs. The general classification of 
results wasn't different, but the poor performers generally 
appeared slightly worse. This is because the finance policy 
of the government has generally been not to finance deficits 
with fresh inflows of equity capital; instead firms are left 
to finance their deficits through borrowing, so that for 
firms in trouble the interest charges will tend to grow as a 
percentage of total costs. 
3. Interestingly, as performance in these firms 
deteriorated they showed opposite tendencies: the Cotton 
Board lost its export market while the KMC lost its domestic 
market. The KMC claims (personal interview) that it lost 
its domestic market because price controls did not allow it 
to pay a sufficient - premiua for high quality beef. Private 
abattoirs have been less effectively bound by price 
controls, offering higher prices than those officially set. 
The result is that high quality beef gets sent to private 
abattoirs. The KMC is left to nrocess pastoralists' cattle, 
most of which is suitable only for making into corned beef, 
for which the market lies in Europe rather than in Kenya. 
On the other hr-nd, the author suspects that the Cotton Lint 
and Seed Marketing Board may have drastically reduced 
exports not because it is incapable of exporting, but 
because it is forced to supply local textile mills first. 
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If volume v/ere greater export levels could be restored. 
9. In most cases it is possible to speak meaningfully of 
the trends in output prices for the firms under study. In 
some cases it was necessary to simplify by considering only 
the price for one product which was considered to be the 
"main" output, though the firm may have supplied a range of 
products, including different qualities. 
10. For most of the firms one can calculate unit price paid 
to farmers for their produce. In a few cases this was not 
possible. For example, the Horticultural Crops Development 
Authority purchases such a long list of commodities that it 
is prohibitive to' try to speak of unit price to suppliers. 
In the sugar industry the nominal producer price is set by 
government. The data presented are somewhat misleading 
since the gross margin realized by farmers differs 
dramatically, depending on the deductions made for services 
provided. See J.E.O. Odada, "Possible Incentives for 
Increased Sugarcane Production in Kenya," presented at a 
seminar on "Incentives for Increased Agricultural 
Production: A Case of Kenya's Sugar Industry," in Kericho, 
10-21 November, 1905. 
11. For estimates showing that such an export market has 
the potential of significantly raising prices of 
pastoralists' livestock, see Ilichael Schluter, 
"International Constraints on Kenya's Agricultural Exports 
to Oil Exporting Countries," I.D.S. Working Paper No. 405, 
June, 1904. 
12. "Review of Statutory Boards: Report and Recommendations 
of the Committee appointed by His Excellency the President," 
chairman, Philip Ndegwa, Government Printer, Nairobi, May, 
1979, p. 5. 
13. A Circular issued by the Office of the President, 
0P.9/21/2A/IV/(171), Circular no.1/81, dated 18 February, 
1981 set maximum salaries for Chief Executives. The 
maximums set were, for many firms, lower than salaries 
already in effect. Incumbents will be allowed to continue 
to receive their former salaries, but when a position turns 
over, the new officer will be paid in accord with the 
maximums set. The firms are left to harmonize their 
internal salary structures, with the approval of their 
parent ministries and the Parastatals Advisory Committee. 
This regulation has had the effect of greatly magnifying the 
role of the government in setting terms of service and 
approving wage negotiations of all parastatals. Some 
par^&tatals have found themselves in anomalous positions, 
for example unionisable wage employees may be earning more 
than the lower level managers who supervise them. The 
effect 6f this on management morale can be guessed at. 
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14. See Treasury Circular No. 12, dated 25th January, 
1985, which details these policies. 
15. "Report of the Civil Service Review Committee 1979-30," 
Chairman S.N. Waruhiu, Government Printer, Nairobi, 
September, 1930, p. 204. 
